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ABSTRACT
Substance dualism has received much attention from philosophers and theologians in contem-
porary literature. Whilst it may have been fashionable in the recent past to dismiss substance 
dualism as an unviable and academically absurd position to hold, this is no longer the case. 
My contention is not so much the merits of substance dualism in general, but a more specified 
variation of substance dualism. My specific contribution to the literature in this article is that 
I argue for the viability of pure substance dualism as a more satisfactory option in contrast to 
compound or composite varieties of substance dualism. I put forth one argument and tease 
out the implications that make compound dualism less than satisfactory. I conclude that, mini-
mally, more work is required on compound variations of dualism to make it a more appealing 
and a philosophically satisfactory option. 
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As of late, there has been a renaissance in the contemporary literature exploring 
substance dualism as a viable philosophical anthropology.1 Given the recent 
discussion, it is simply not responsible to dismiss substance dualism as it has 
been fashionable to do in the recent past.2 My contention here is not so much 
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1 See the following: FOSTER 1991; ROBINSON 2011; SWINBURNE 1997;  GOETZ 
and TALIAFERRO 2011; CORCORAN 2001; INWAGEN and ZIMMERMAN 2007; 
BAKER and GOETZ 2011; TALIAFERRO 1994; TALIAFERRO 2013; MORELAND 
2000; LOWE 2001; SMYTHIES and BELOFF 1989. 
2 This may be due in part to an uncritical assumption that Hume’s writings on causa-
tion have ruled out theism and the possibility of causal interaction between immaterial and 152 Joshua FARRIS
with the merits of substance dualism in general, but the merits of a particular 
brand of substance dualism known as pure substance dualism (hereafter PSD) in 
contrast to composite/compound substance dualism (hereafter COSD). PSD is 
the view that I am strictly and essentially identified with my soul/ mind. COSD 
is the view that I am somehow comprised of both body and soul.3 I put forward 
a fresh argument comprised of a set of arguments in favour of PSD as a more 
satisfying and cogent position in contrast to COSD primarily based on intuitive 
knowledge concerning the self that is definite and clear.4 
THE I-CONCEPT AS PERSPICUOUS AND DEFINITE IN NATURE
I discuss the first-person perspective or first-person knowledge as a ground for 
motivating the discussion. I believe this offers some support and semblance of 
meaning as to what the soul is by nature.5 The first-person perspective is char-
acteristic of persons that is, arguably, not shareable with other distinct individual 
objects. In fact, no two persons share the exact same conscious perspectives. 
The first-person perspective is deeply subjective in contrast to the third-person 
perspective. When contrasting the first-person perspective with third-person 
knowledge, there is a massive dissimilarity. One is describable or reducible to 
scientific processes, and the other is describable only in terms of something con-
trary to scientific processes. The first-person perspective is not reducible to or 
describable in terms of material events. First-person knowledge is characteristi-
cally deeply subjective, internal, introspectively accessible and in some modest 
sense private in contrast to third-person knowledge, which is public and exter-
nal. I suggest that this comprises, in part, our understanding of the I-concept or 
soul-concept. This provides us with some content for understanding what the 
soul is and provides a foundation for considering afresh the prospects of PSD in 
contrast to other varieties of substance dualism.6
material entities. Largely motivating the dismissal of dualism has come from Gilbert Ryle. See 
RYLE 1949: 18. 
3 At times, this is rather vague in the literature. 
4 Many of the arguments to follow in favour of PSD could, potentially, be re-articulated in 
favour of a strict Immaterialism. Immaterialism, as a global metaphysic, would be the notion 
that all objects are immaterial in nature. See the first two chapters in: INWAGEN and ZIM-
MERMAN 2007. Cf. FOSTER 1991. 
5 See CHALMERS 2004. Here Chalmers notes the difficulties of such a project and its 
limits in terms of correlation studies. Cf. GULLICK 1992; JACKSON 1998. 
6 See Chisholm for help on these matters of ‘internalism’ and introspective access to the 
self. CHISHOLM 1976; CHISHOLM 1981; CHISHOLM 1986. 153 Pure or Compound Dualism? Considering Afresh the Prospects...
THE I-OR SOUL-CONCEPT AND THE PROSPECTS 
OF COMPOSITE/COMPOUND DUALISM
For the purposes of clarifying the intuitions given above concerning the soul-
concept, I assume a modal situation wherein souls persist from somatic death 
into a disembodied state. I will begin with some of the solutions or options for 
the compound dualist in accounting for the person’s persistence from embodi-
ment to disembodied existence.7 The first option I will call the literal compo-
und dualist view. The second option I will call the property or event compound 
dualist view. The third option I will call the tertiary-thing or transcendent com-
pound dualist view. 
The first option accounting for the modal scenario above is called the lit-
eral compound dualist view. As argued above concerning our knowledge of 
persons, if I am literally both concrete-parts, body and soul, then I am literally 
one thing and two things. If I am literally one thing and two things, then the 
I-concept contradicts itself because I would no longer be the thing that persists 
through all of my mental states. The Logic of Identity is undermined by the fact 
of a thing being one and two things at the same time. This becomes especially 
clear in the case of a person persisting from a state of embodiment to a state of 
being separated from the body.8 If I am literally both body and soul, then either 
I would cease to exist apart from the body or I would exist in part. Both supply 
problems for the compound dualist, which I do not think he would be willing 
to accept upon clear reflection of the solutions. For if I were not able to exist 
due to losing a concrete-part of myself, then the principal reason for accepting 
this modal situation is undermined by the fact that even if the soul persists it is 
not I that persists, but the soul-part that previously composed me.9 Thus, the 
compound dualist assumes an incoherent notion of persistence and his modal 
7 This assumes the notion of ‘presentism’. See MARKOSIAN 2006. For a refutation of 
this concept of the ‘I’, see JOHNSTON 2010. 
8 Cf. NOONAN 2011. This is a useful canvassing of the issues surrounding ‘identity’. See 
especially the section entitled ‘Criteria of identity’. Particularly, for the discussion concern-
ing on ‘personal identity’ see SHOEMAKER 2009; SWINBURNE 1997; SWINBURNE 
1998.
9 It might be argued that composition and constitution are distinct from identity and 
that persons can persist from embodiment to disembodiment. Such that when the body and 
soul are united, they are literally one in virtue of the soul spatially being in the body. When 
the soul is separated from the body at death, then the person transfers from supervening on 
both body and soul to the soul. This is rather odd. First, this construal may work with other 
construals of compound dualism, such as the options I put forward below. Second, it is odd 
to say that once originally constituted a person could become constituted by something else. 
On the other hand, the person could be tied to the body contingently, such that the person is 
literally in the body during the state of embodiment and later disembodied the person is still 
the same. This still seems more naturally a form of pure substance dualism. 154 Joshua FARRIS
intuitions about the conceivability of the person’s persistence from embodiment 
to disembodiment is undermined by a confused and illogical conception of per-
sonal identity. The soul that is persisting is not the same ‘I’ that is persisting. The 
other solution is to accept the notion that ‘I’ is a partitive notion within personal 
identity. Thus, literally I am partially myself when the part-soul detaches from 
the body. I hardly believe most substance dualists are willing to affirm this con-
clusion.10 To do so would mean accepting a philosophically confused concep-
tion of persons that loses the virtues characteristically assumed with substance 
dualism, thus further undermining the I-concept as it was argued for above. This 
then seems an unlikely option for the defender of COSD. 
The second option or solution is called the property or event view of com-
pound dualism. I argue that it suffers from a diminished conception of personal 
identity and an indefinite I-concept similar to that of physicalists. The situa-
tion is similar whether I am a property or an event. As a property or an event, 
somehow I supervene on the composite of body and soul. First, I am not at 
this point literally body or soul but the thing or property that emerges from 
or minimally supervenes on the body and soul. Second, if I am a property or 
event that supervenes on the body/soul composite, then I could not transfer 
from embodied existence to disembodied existence. To do so would mean my 
transferring from the compound to the single soul as substance. This seems 
problematic in the simple fact that it is both body and soul that composes me. 
It seems unlikely that a property/event could persist in this manner without 
the appropriate base. If the property/event emerged or surfaced by superven-
ing on the composite of body and soul, then the property/event would seem to 
require the body and soul composite for persistence. Third, an event lacks the 
persistence conditions presupposed with the I-concept. An event is a state of 
affairs, and states of affairs require specified conditions for a particular event to 
obtain. In this case, the conditions seem to include the interaction between soul 
and body, so much the worse for the defender of this construal of COSD. This 
solution is unpromising. 
The third option or solution is called the transcendental view of COSD. 
On this view, often ascribed to Immanuel Kant, the ‘I’ is necessarily in space, 
yet transcends space. There is an enduring ‘I’ with self-ascription who neces-
sarily transcends object confinement yet is conscious of objects, thus there is 
a body to which persons ascribe personhood.11 As stated above, the notion is 
that I am something other than body and soul, yet I am somehow composed 
of body and soul.12 The objection to this view is the I-know-not-what objec-
10 Although, some are willing to affirm this. Robert Pasnau affirms that personal identity 
is degreed in nature in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (PASNAU 2002: 389). 
11 For a recent exposition of this view see HAAG 2010: 127–143.
12 Alternatively, it is a body to which one ascribes personhood. From this view or a varia-
tion of it, one could draw from the recent literature on constitution in contrast to identity. 155 Pure or Compound Dualism? Considering Afresh the Prospects...
tion that undermines the I-concept that we seem to have intuitively. Instead of 
having some clarity over the notion ‘I’, I have an inaccessible ‘I’ that falls into 
an abyss of deep scepticism or pure agnosticism. On this view, then, concepts 
concerning personal identity are out of reach and closed to the contender of 
COSD. Potentially, this variation of COSD faces something worse than is found 
in ‘mysterian’ physicalism. With ‘mysterian’ physicalism, the ‘I’ and concepts 
from consciousness become cognitively closed due to the physical law of causal 
closure.13 In this circumstance, the ‘I’ is closed not by some principle that offers 
some explanation of the natural physical world of physical causes and effects, but 
by a pure agnosticism regarding the ‘I’ and its mental states. This is worse than 
physicalism, arguably, and undermines the attempt to draw some content on the 
notion of the self/person from the thought-experiment. 
The defender of COSD could deny the conceivability of the person’s dis-
embodied survival. Motivations for denial might include the idea that he does 
not wish to affirm the awkward implications this would entail for his notion of 
survival or the possibility that personal survival in a disembodied state is liter-
ally incoherent on his view. I believe this response is undesirable. First, it denies 
one of the principal and traditional reasons for accepting substance dualism.14 
Second, concerning those who are also religiously motivated it denies the legiti-
macy of theology as a source of knowledge, which is a reason for accepting sub-
stance dualism for accounting for the religious notion relating to disembodied 
survival. Third, it comes seductively close to motivating other denials, such as 
the denial of the simplicity of the self, which for many defenders of substance 
dualism is not a debatable issue. To deny the soul’s survival because of the loss of 
the part-body is to affirm the notion of the complex or composite person. One, 
then, would seem to affirm, implicitly, the denial of soul simplicity. The notion 
that the self is simple and tied to the I-concept, as argued for above. To deny 
this would in effect be to affirm the complexity of the person. This is to deny 
an important virtue of substance dualism. Given the ambiguity with COSD, 
I suggest that proponents of substance dualism re-consider pure dualism and 
seek to reconcile the tensions it may have with the findings of the empirical 
For a useful development of the ‘constitution’ criterion see BAKER 2000. Baker is defend-
ing a variation of materialism by utilizing the ‘constitution’ criterion in contrast to personal 
identity, but one could flush this out as a variation of substance dualism. Cf. CORCORAN 
2006. 
13 See MCGINN 1999. Colin McGinn offers a treatment of ‘mysterianism’ that has 
gained popularity among materialists regarding consciousness. 
14 Hossack points out that one of the principal motivations for accepting substance dual-
ism is because of ethics and philosophy of religion, not metaphysical reasons (HOSSACK 
2007: 196). I think this is partly true, but as I show here, there are massive metaphysical and 
epistemological benefits to substance dualism: consider intentionality, public and private 
knowledge, etc. It is certainly not limited to those religiously motivated. Cf. HART 1988: 7.156 Joshua FARRIS
sciences.15 Alternatively, one could accept physicalism and the vagueness of 
concepts found within its framework,16 thereby rejecting the benefits of the 
definite soul-concept both philosophically and theologically, and rejecting the 
notion of disembodied survival; for the physicalist has no bone to pick with 
disembodied survival. 
PARSIMONY AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM 
Substance dualists generally recognize the fact that cognition, thinking and 
related activity is an activity of the mind and is inexplicable in terms of the physi-
cal. Given this and what is argued above, is it not simpler and more sensible to 
affirm a version of substance dualism that can account for the definite I-concept 
without ambiguity? It seems so. Compound dualism, in all the variations listed 
above, lends itself to ambiguity of the self and/or requires a tertium quid. On 
PSD, the soul/mind is just the person that is tightly and intimately connected 
to the body yet without confusion or mixture.17 The defender of PSD assumes 
the naturalness of the soul having the capacity for activity beyond that seen in 
physical nature. Further, the proponent of PSD has the resources to account 
for the functional integration of the body and soul when the soul is embodied. 
Arguably, the body when interactive with the soul gives the soul new powers and 
capabilities, but this is not the same as affirming the person is a soul plus body. 
The proponent of PSD identifies persons with souls. Therefore, PSD is a simpler 
theory when offering a metaphysical explanation for persons, the operation of 
thinking, and it has greater clarity as a position in contrast to COSD. 
Having said this, there may be a way to offer a view that is somewhere be-
tween PSD and COSD. This would require the defender of COSD to do two 
things. First, the defender needs to establish that the body is a contingent part of 
the person as a soul substance. This means that the body is contingently related 
15 The only real difficulty for pure dualism is the notion of fine-grained dependence of 
mind on brain, but even this hardly seems like a knock-down argument against pure dualism 
because of the state of science and its fluctuating conclusions, our lack of a theory over the 
brain and mind relation and to what degree the mind depends on the brain. 
16 One could possibly accept the constitution theory of persons, property dualism or 
emergent dualism. All of these views have similar benefits found in substance dualism, yet lack 
the plausibility of a persisting self to account for conscious mental states; thus, a reason for 
accepting substance dualism. I consider these views to be broadly physicalist in nature. Emer-
gent substance dualism is a debatable version of physicalism. In this view the brain somehow 
produces the mind. The mind is literally a product of the brain in the natural world of event-
occurrences. Cf. BAKER 2000. Also see CORCORAN 2001; CORCORAN 2006. 
17 Someone may object to the notion that PSD could have this tight of a connection. 
I would offer, that apart from ontological identity, the defender of PSD could affirm a phe-
nomenological and functional unity to the extent that soul and body act as one. I do not see 
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to the soul and fills out a larger view of the person like a compound structure.18 
Hence, the body does not comprise the person in any literal or essential sense but 
becomes a part of the soul just as a metal bar becomes an extension to an already 
existing building structure. Second, and more difficult, the defender needs to 
provide a reason for thinking that the body is actually a part of the soul when 
the soul is embodied. It is not unnatural to perceive the soul as exemplifying 
properties that exclude properties instantiated by physical things. The two are 
foundationally and fundamentally different, so providing a reason for thinking 
that the body is contingently a part of the soul is rather difficult. It is one thing 
to say that the body becomes a part like a compound structure, but why should 
anyone think this is the case. There is neither a natural nor an intuitive reason for 
thinking this is the case. If one merely asserts that it is the case, then one hardly 
has any conceptual clarity beyond that of a pure variety of substance dualism.19 
This question is distinct from the question as to whether or not souls causally 
interact with bodies. Whilst we may not have an explanation of how this is so, 
we know it is so in terms of our phenomenological experiences. The more im-
portant question is the question of union. Why should I think that I am literally 
united to the body that I inhabit and use? This question deserves further reflec-
tion in the contemporary literature.20 Additionally, this is deserving of further 
consideration in another context. My conclusion here is that there are fresh and 
responsible reasons for affirming a pure variety of substance dualism given what 
emerges in the contemporary literature on substance dualism.
CONCLUSION
As radical as it may sound in a day where materialism dominates the academy, 
I offer PSD as having several benefits that distinguish it from other varieties of 
substance dualism. Maximally, I have shown COSD incoherent. Minimally, 
I have shown COSD to lack some important clarity. Either way, the defender 
18 Richard Swinburne provides a similar explanation when he discusses the relationship 
between the body and soul as a compound structure (SWINBURNE 1997). Also cf. SWIN-
BURNE 2007: 162–163, especially footnote 24. Cf. GOETZ and TALIAFERRO 2011. 
19 It may be that there are differing kinds of PSD wherein some variations have little use 
for the body, and others see the neural structure as teleologically related to the soul and the 
functional implementation of the soul.
20 I believe Eric T. Olson has made a persuasive case for the lack of clarity on how this is 
so and why one should think the body is a part (OLSON 2001). This is true of Swinburne’s 
explanation, as shown above. Charles Taliaferro offers some interesting thoughts wherein the 
union between the soul and body is often spoken of in terms of a functional or phenomeno-
logical unity, and while this is important for substantiating the value of the body, I am not sure 
that it gains much purchase on the ontic union of body and soul. See TALIAFERRO 2013: 
46–59. Something along these lines needs further explication. 158 Joshua FARRIS
of COSD has more work to do on the matter of clarifying the relational union 
of both body and soul.
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